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IN THE SUPRElvff: COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

B 0 A R D OF EDUCATION OF
THE GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Statutory corporation,

Plaintiff-Respondent_, Case No.
9844

vs.
REX H. COX and WILMIN A COX,
his wife,
Defendants-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
This is an action by which plaintiff seeks to take
appellant's property by way of an alleged contract,
OR in the alternative, by way of condemnation proceedings. Said action having been filed in two separate
causes of action, respectively.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted a default judgment on
the first cause of action against both defendants. Both
defendants moved the lower court to set aside the Default Judgment. Defendant Rex H. Cox appeals from
an order denying his motion to set aside the Default
Judgment. Defendant Wilmina Cox does not join in
this appeal as the lower court granted her motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Rex H. Cox seeks reversal of the lower
court's order denying his motion to set aside the default
judgment, and the right to have a trial upon the merits
of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff caused the defendants to be served
with a copy of its Summons and Complaint on or about
September 10, 1962. The plaintiff pleading its case in
two causes of action; one, requesting to take defendants'
property by way of an alleged contract and two, by
means of conde1nnation proceedings. The Salt Lake
County Clerk executed a default certificate on or about
October 2, 1962. Judge Merrill C. Faux granted default judgment against both defendants on or about
October 5, 1962 on plaintiff's first cause of action. The
defendants were served notice of said judgment on or
about N oven1ber 9, 1962 and contacted counsel as soon
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after as appointment could be made. Defendants'
counsel immediately contacted plaintiff's counsel. N egotiations were pending ·for a period of approximately
ten days between respective counsel and their respective clients without success. Defendants filed a Motion
to Set Aside the Judgment as well as a Motion and
Order to Stay Proceedings and Stay Execution of
Judgment with the lower court and plaintiff's counsel,
on or about November 28, 1962, pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable

neglect.
2. That the judgment was based upon a void con-

tract for the reason that the same did not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
3. That the purported contract, the subject of

said judgment, is void or voidable for failure
of consideration.
4. That the judgment is inequitable.

The proceedings and execution of judgment being
stayed as of that date until further order of the court.
Defendants' motion was called up for hearing before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on December 4,
1962, all parties being present and being represented
by counsel. At this time testimony was adduced by both
sides and the lower court took the matter under advisement and to see if the parties could not resolve their
differences. The motion was further argued to the
lower court by respective counsel and submitted for
decision.
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The lower court granted the motion to set aside
the judgment as to Wilmina Cox but denied same as
to Rex H. Cox. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and an Order were filed and both plaintiff and defendant Rex H. Cox filed respective motions to have
the lower court reconsider its Order and the court
denied same. This appeal was then made on behalf
of the defendant Rex H. Cox, and defendant Wilmina
Cox has filed her Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint on
file. Said case now is pending before the lower court.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S, REX H.
COX'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
The defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment was based upon the following grounds:
(R. 13).
1. Due to mistake, inadvertence, and excusable

neglect.
2. That the judgment heretofore entered was

based upon a void contract for the reason that
same did not cmnply with the Statute of
Frauds.
3. That the purported contract, the subject of
said judgment, is void or voidable for failure
of consideration.
4. That the judgment is inequitable.
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Rule 55 (c) U.R.C.P. states:
"For good cause shown the court may set aside
an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordance with Rule 60 (b)."
Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P. states, among other things,
that the court, on motion and upon such terms as are
just and in the furtherance of justice, may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order or proceedbag.
The statutory authority of trial courts to set aside
judgments obtained by default has been liberally construed to the end that there be trials on the merits,
beginning with our earliest decisions. Utah Commercial
& Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P. 1033
(1898).
The court will incline toward granting relief in
doubtful cases so that the party may have a hearing.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., et al, 123 Utah 416, 422,
260 P. 2nd 741, 744 (1953). The Utah Supreme Court
in this case had occasion to review the policy considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal construction,
thus:
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is
a creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which
prevent the presentation of a claim or defense.
* * * Equity considers factors which may be
irrelevant in actions at law, such as the * * *
5
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hardship in granting or denying relief. Although
an equity court no longer has complete discretion in granting or denying relief, it may exercise wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and public convenience * * * ."
The above view was also affirmed in Hurd v. Ford,
74 Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929), as well as other Utah
cases.
Under Rule 1 (a) U.R.C.P., a defendant must be
extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his
case and to meet an adversary's claims. This rule has
been affirmed many times by our Utah Supreme Court
and as is set forth in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp.,
cited in 264 P. 2nd 880, as follows:
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liberally construed' to secure a 'just * * * determination of every action', * * * a defendant must
be extended every reasonable opportunity to
prepare his case and to meet an adversary's
claims. Also he n1ust be protected against surprise and be assured equal opportunity and
facility to present and prove counter contentions,
-else unilateral justice and injustice would result sufficient to raise serious doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees."
The situation in the instant case now before the bar
is patently one of the very kind which the above referred
to rules were designed to grant relief. The Honorable
Utah Supre1ne Court has handed down several decisions in the past few months directly in point. In the
cases of E. J. MalJhrw v. Standard Gilsonite Company
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and Beaver Dam Sales Company v. Standard Gilsonite
Co1npany, cited in 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951, Justice
Crockett, speaking in connection with Rule 60 (b) U.R.
C.P., stated as follows:

''On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party * * * from a final judgment * * *
for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence_, surprise, or excusable neglect * * * .
The motion shall be made * * * not more than 3
months after the judgment * * * was entered
* * * ." (Emphasis added.)
Justice Crockett speaking further In the same case
said:
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court
is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying such motions. However, it is also true that the court cannot act
arbitrarily in that regard, but should be generally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry
and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled
advisedly in conformity with law and justice.
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably
on a party without a hearing is obviously a harsh
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our
system of justice that each party to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. For that reason it is
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment
where there is reasonable justification or excuse
for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely
application is made to set it aside."
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Chief Justice Wade in the very recent case of
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, cited in 377 P. 2d
189, reaffirming the above views, states as follows:
"Judgments by default are not favored by
the courts nor are they in the interest of justice
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the merits. The courts, in the
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a
hearing on the merits of every case."
Several other cases in which our court has affirmed
the decisions of the above cases are: N ey v. Harrison)
5 Utah 2d 217, 220, 209 P. 2d 1114, 1116 {1956), and
Bylund v. Crook, 60 Utah 285, 288, 208 P. 504, 505
{1922).
In the case at bar the defendant had no knowledge
of the default judgment until November 9, 1962 and
immediately thereafter contacted counsel, who attempted to negotiate the matter with plaintiff's attorney for
approximately 10 days. ''Then an agreement could not
be reached, Motions to Set Aside the Judgment and to
Stay Proceedings were filed which of course shows no
undue delay in moving the court to set aside the judgment. (R. 25).
It is very apparent from the record that the defendant misunderstood legal proceedings, that he had
a misconception as to what a Summons was, and the
reason for not replying to same, and as to what his
rights were. ( R. 25, 26, 44, 46) .
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It is not our purpose to quote extensively from the
record but it is very evident from the entire record of
the testimony of both of the defendants that there has
been considerable misunderstanding both as to the lawsuit and an alleged contract. It is also very evident
from the testimony of both of the defendants that there
has been no acceptance of the purported contract, no
meeting of the minds to say the least, that even though
the alleged original offer recites consideration both of
the defendants testified that no consideration was received by them and that the alleged offer, as represented by Exhibit 1, does not now appear to be as displayed to them. Furthermore, said offer was withdrawn
or rejected as is adn1itted in the record by all parties;
therefore, said purported contract, or a subsequent one,
which we expressly deny, must fail for failure of consideration, no acceptance, and because same does not
comply with the statute of frauds because not in writing as required. Certainly there is a big issue as to
whether a contract does exist and one in which the
issues should be tried.
We invite the court's attention to the fact that this
case is not the usual contract type of case but is one in
which the defendant's home is being taken without due
process of law and in a manner that will cause extreme
hardship not only upon this defendant but on the other
defendant (his wife) and their family.
It is the intent of our laws to consolidate cases
rather than separate them. To require the defendant
9
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to sell his joint interest in the family residence for a
price set by the plaintiff and to require the other defendant to separately litigate her interest in the same
property certainly is not in the interest of justice and
fair play and is in violation of our statutes. To compel
the defendant to accept one sum of money established
by the plaintiff for his equity in the family residence
and the other defendant to accept an arbitrated price
(to be set through litigation) for her equity in the same
residence certainly is grossly inequitable and unjust and one which will create serious tax consequences
to all parties concerned. Furthermore, to compel the
defendant to accept a "below market price" for his share
in the property, as set forth in the record by both defendants, without a complete opportunity for a hearing
on the merits of the case, is grossly inequitable, against
public policy, and to say the least, against justice and
fair play.
The record and the above cited cases bear out the
fact that one or more of the reasons for setting aside a
default judgment as set out in Rules 55 (c) and 60 (b),
U.R.C.P., has been so thwarted that equity and good
conscience demand that the judgment against the defendant be set aside.
The lower court was uncertain as to what to do as
is evidenced by the statement found in the record as
follows: "It is difficult to see where the end result
of my ruling will be." ( R. 54) . The lower court further
indica ted that he did not like the demeanor of the defendant and we quote from the record as follows: " * * *
his demeanor on ~he witness stand'' (R. 53) and further,
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as follows: " * * * and as to his testimony I was impressed with what appeared to be a lack of veracity,
a lack of straightforwardness." (R. 54). It is apparent
from the foregoing that the court acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and abused its discretion in refusing to
vacate the default judgment. The record bears out the
fact that there was misunderstanding and confusion
surrounding all the dealings and therefore all parties
should have an opportunity to present their cases and
have their day in court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in dismissing defendant's
motion. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the
case at bar is one of the very kind for which Rule 55
(c) and 60 (b) of our U.R.C.P. were designed to grant
relief, one in which the interests of justice and fair play
require that the motion to set aside the default judgment be granted and the defendant afforded the right
to litigate his case on the merits at the same time with
the other defendant, his wife.
The judgment of the lower court refusing to set
aside the default judgment as to this defendant should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAHL AND SAGERS
17 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah
Everett E. Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for Defendant
Apellant
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